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IMMANUEL KANT famously remarked that it was David Hume who stirred him
from his dogmatic slumbers. In some sense, much of Kant’s work can be read as an
engagement with Hume. It was likewise in response to an equally famous ques-
tion, “what is Enlightenment?,” that Kant sought to sketch the outlines of
modern critical philosophy. The question remains pertinent even today. It was,
of course, Hume’s scepticism that prodded Kant from his lethargic state, but
why should Hume’s scepticism, as opposed to other kinds of modern and
ancient scepticism of which Kant was certainly aware, have done so?
While the women of Ko¨nigsberg set their watches by Kant’s punctuality, the
ladies of Paris set their conversations by Hume’s conviviality. Hume wished to
be an ambassador from the halls of learning to the locales of polite conversation.
His essays on politics, morals, and literature were aimed at achieving in print what
he hoped was conveyed in person by his presence in the Parisian salons.
Philosophy, for Hume, had to leave the rarefied air of scholastic disputation
and, with the Spectator, find its way into the clubs and coffee houses of Europe.
In short, Hume was on a social mission. He hoped to publicize his sceptical sol-
ution to the various philosophical, political, moral, and economic problems of
his age. It was this sceptical philosophy, initially expressed in the Treatise and con-
tinuously polished and reformulated over the rest of Hume’s life, to which Kant
reacted so vigorously.
Were Kant and Hume on similar intellectual trajectories? Were they in fact
speaking the same scholarly language? If so, what was the extent, nature, and
scope of this discourse? Was this discussion and its accompanying intellectual
baggage one of “Enlightenment”? Answers to these kinds of questions continue
to generate a range of scholarly and popular answers, sometimes bringing much
of interest to light, if at times too much heat. Scholarship on the Enlightenment
continues to ask penetrating questions, many of which problematize the relation-
ship between Enlightenment and modernity and are all the more interesting when
considered alongside contemporary debates over “new” atheism and postmodern-
ism. No less important for readers of this journal are the social and cultural studies
perhaps most readily associated with the work of Robert Darnton, among others,
which have not only generated important new ways of understanding
Enlightenment but have invigorated the field more generally.1 Consideration of
two relatively recent contributions to Enlightenment scholarship demonstrates
these abiding concerns and the shape of future Enlightenment scholarship.
Both works offer intellectual context, but of alternative kinds. Locke,
Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the Enlightenment and
Beyond by Daniel Carey explores an alternative philosophical genealogy to the
standard and well-worn British empiricist triumvirate of John Locke, George
Berkeley, and David Hume; The Case for the Enlightenment by John Robertson
tackles the comparative intellectual histories of Scotland and Naples. Carey’s
book is dedicated to the exploration of the problem of diversity in the
Enlightenment; Robertson’s to the exposition of the singular, unitary nature of
the Enlightenment tout court. Interestingly for readers of this journal, both
works seek to contextualize their accounts in what may loosely be called social
terms, that is, within the framework of broader social changes; Carey points to
several social factors, such as “new world” encounters, while Robertson examines
the social aspects of Scottish and Neapolitan intellectual milieus. Both attempt in
different ways to relate their work to contemporary questions and concerns:
Carey’s book concludes by comparing contemporary scholarship on the subject
of diversity with his Enlightenment theorists; Robertson’s engages with a set of
powerful interpretations of the Enlightenment and ends with a resounding endor-
sement of his theorists’ case for Enlightenment as that of his own. Both books
deserve to be read not only by intellectual historians, but by social, cultural,
and political historians as well.
Scholarly debate over the nature of the Enlightenment provides an interesting
parallel to the debate over diversity in the early modern period. Carey’s work
expressly seeks to problematize, rather than “totalize,” any account of the
Enlightenment by highlighting philosophical oppositions and tensions rather
than unity. The outlines of such frictions are framed within Locke’s thinking on
the subject of diversity and carried through to the respective responses in
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, the Scottish Enlightenment, and beyond. This agenda
is constructed in a number of interesting ways. Carey brackets Locke’s thinking
on the subject of diversity into its relationship to three kinds of writings: those
of antiquity, “natural history,” and early modern travel literature. In more
general terms, diversity as a “problem” is structured around debates over
human nature and the perceived moral consequences of these theories. In the
case of Locke, Carey observes, there is a paradox; though Locke wished to
make use of cultural diversity as a tool in his argument against innatism, he
meant to do so in a way that did not imply moral scepticism. Of course, many
1 Cf. Robert Darnton, The Business of Enlightenment: A Publishing History of the Encyclope´die, 1775–
1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); see also Richard B. Sher, Enlightenment and
the Book: Scottish Authors and their Publishers in Eighteenth-Century Scotland, Ireland and America
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
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of his contemporaries, like Bishop Stillingfleet, charged him with precisely that,
arguing that he undermined the distinction between virtue and vice, good and
evil, pointing not only to his attacks on innatism but to his anti-social, hedonistic
account of human motivation. One virtue of Carey’s account is that he manages to
recapture both Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s responses, sometimes eclipsed by
Locke’s stature, while convincingly detailing how the debate over cultural diversity
and human nature played out in a post-Lockean world.
How did Locke come to take cultural diversity as a social fact? Carey shows that
Locke’s interest in the diversity of human custom was framed by his reading of
“natural histories” such as those of Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, and Henry
Oldenburg. Locke’s rejection of a priori reasoning meant he also rejected the
assumption of the uniformity of human action prior to evaluation. This stance
was shared by the new science with which Locke was familiar, in which the accep-
tance of human diversity was regarded as the foundation for any acceptable under-
standing of the world. Where the natural philosophers wrote natural histories,
Locke wrote a natural history of man, taking reports of human diversity
from the many travellers’ accounts of which he owned a good number. Carey per-
ceptively argues that Locke’s reason for adopting this stance owes something to
his argument in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. An inductive,
observational method was therefore appropriate for the purposes of his epistemo-
logical arguments, and it translated nicely into his anthropological investigations.
For both Locke and the new scientists, Carey observes, the only appropriate
course of action was that of slowly and cautiously accumulating evidence in
order to draw proper inferences. Diversity was both the outcome and methodo-
logical principle of investigation for Locke.
This methodological principle was worrying to Locke’s contemporaries
because it aligned itself with the arguments drawn from the sceptical tradition
of antiquity, as Carey details in chapter 2. Attacking innateness incurred the
charge of moral relativism, even though Locke argued that reason provided
the means to securing moral and religious duty (to say nothing of revelation).
What were these perceived similarities? According to Carey, Locke’s criticisms
of the consensus gentium, premised on the observation that entire nations
existed that did not fit the mould, such as China, and his repetition of similar
criticisms voiced in antiquity by sceptics like Sextus Empiricus proved suffi-
ciently worrying. The fact of cultural diversity was properly accounted for by
Locke’s “law of opinion.” As Carey points out, Locke argued that moral
systems required a specific set of rules or laws, as well as a lawgiver (God,
society) to enforce these rules or laws through rewards and punishments; yet
opinion, fashion, and reputation provided the actual content and criteria for
moral judgement and practice through the world. Locke stabilized this dizzying
claim by arguing that the faculty of reason possessed by humans was able to
determine moral law and its lawgiver. Though Locke retreated from the stronger
claim that reason provided the source of the moral and cultural agreement
as it did exist, he suggested that the language of morality was recognizable
everywhere, from Brussels to Brazil. Agreement in language, however, was
Diverse Enlightenments 265
not enough; for Locke, uniformity of action alone provided the convincing
criteria for the consensus gentium claim.
Carey outlines the ways in which Locke’s most famous pupil, the Earl of
Shaftesbury, rejected his arguments on human nature, moral philosophy, and
cultural diversity primarily by focusing on his reaffirmation of Stoicism. The key
components of Shaftesbury’s rejection centre around his deployment of the
Stoic prolepsis argument, whereby consensus, like knowledge, is not actual
but potential, manifest in the uniform cultivation of moral and aesthetic taste
and expressed through shared ideas of virtue reflecting the cosmic order.
Consequently diversity and deformity are merely expressions of the negative con-
sequences of custom, education, religion, and error. Carey’s important manuscript
find reveals some of Shaftebsury’s practical criticisms of the “law of opinion” argu-
ment, which accuses Locke of eliding social preference with moral appraisal (rakes
know their actions to be bad even if they are fashionable, for example). While
Shaftesbury dismisses Locke’s reliance on travel literature and accuses him of
moral nominalism in contrast to his own realism, Carey observes that the two thin-
kers nonetheless converge on the point of religious tolerance. Shaftesbury had no
need for religious uniformity because he ascribed and expected it through his
understanding of moral and aesthetic taste. His aversion to religious excesses,
whether superstitious or enthusiastic, combined with his criticisms of revealed reli-
gion, put him at odds with Locke’s case for toleration, which was grounded in
Christian morality and the security of virtue (divine lawgiver).
With Hutcheson’s adoption of Shaftesbury’s moral sense argument and Locke’s
observational method, Carey strikes the balance between earlier thinkers on the
problem of diversity. Hutcheson accounted for diversity by positing four causes:
rival views of happiness, the effect of narrow systems of thought and belief on
action, differing conceptions of what the Deity required, and, lastly, the (mis)asso-
ciation of ideas. Cultural diversity of moral action was thus produced without
touching his more famous argument for the moral sense. Moreover, Hutcheson
took a more aggressive stance by requiring his opponents to produce whole
societies that did not distinguish between treachery, cruelty, and torture on the
one hand, and compassion, humanity, and liberality on the other. Carey’s
central claim in reference to Hutcheson, then, is that he attempted to integrate
Shaftesbury’s Stoic philosophical conclusions with Locke’s technical resources.
In this, Carey notes, “he bequeathed a problem to his successors in the Scottish
Enlightenment, but not necessarily a solution.” Carey concludes by examining
this problem, which has exercised some of the most prominent contemporary thin-
kers from Clifford Geertz to Charles Taylor.2
Carey offers a compelling and important account of the early modern and
Enlightenment debates on the subject of moral diversity. His approach allows
him considerable latitude while remaining concise. Yet such an approach also
2 Cf. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Charles Taylor,
Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
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lends itself to many more questions than can in fact be answered, and the accom-
panying issue of whether or not such questions would change Carey’s presen-
tation. Aside from historiographical and hermeneutical queries, there remains
the larger issue of method. For a work of contextualist intellectual history, the
book is rather light on social, cultural, and political contexts; it remains for the
most part a conversation between texts. To take just one of these alternative con-
textual discourses might enhance Carey’s argument to a significant degree,
perhaps providing a richer understanding of how debates over diversity were
related to the broader world in which they were articulated. One area where
this might have been done in short order, and to good effect, would have been
to consider the increased publication, availability, and readership of both the
travel and sceptical literature in early modernity. This would lend itself to a
broader consideration of why Locke’s moment was the one in which diversity
became a widely accepted “problem,” as opposed to an earlier period that was
also aware of difference and diversity. This kind of social tack could in fact
open the space for a larger consideration of the Enlightenment and the place of
the diversity problem within it.
Where Carey’s text explores tensions and oppositions in the Enlightenment’s
consideration of diversity, John Robertson’s masterful work is without question
set to the task of presenting a singular, unified Enlightenment, complete with a
checklist of arguments, their expression in diverse European settings (Scotland,
Naples), and chronological markers (1680–1740). The Case for the
Enlightenment begins with an historiographical essay that takes stock of the “frag-
mentary” interpretations of the Enlightenment, be they national, cultural, radical,
plural, or postmodern.3 In their stead, a comparative method aimed at distilling
the central elements of the intellectual movement is posited, constituted by the
development of three intellectual phenomena: the convergence of Augustinian
and Epicurean thinking, the philosophically restricted concern for human better-
ment in this world with no reference to the afterlife, and the emergence of political
economy as the means to achieve this betterment. The reader is tempted to con-
clude that “the” Enlightenment is little more than modernity’s trinity: materialism,
progress, and capitalism. That would be a crude way of putting Robertson’s thesis,
but it would not be wholly unfair or inaccurate.
Robertson’s powerful and immensely learned case for “the” Enlightenment is
predicated on the fruits of comparative history that moves across five broad axes:
the comparison of Scottish and Neapolitan history circa 1700, including their
respective social and intellectual milieus; the comparison of social and political con-
texts, specifically the challenge presented by the predicament of kingdoms governed
3 Cf. Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World (London: Penguin,
2000); Robert Darnton, The Forbidden Best-sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1995); Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of
Modernity, 1650–1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and
Religion (4 vols.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999–).
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as provinces; the comparison of the philosophies of Giambattista Vico and David
Hume, and their responses to modern Epicureanism and the “new philosophy”
as articulated by Pierre Bayle, Bernard Mandeville, and Rene´ Descartes respect-
ively; and the comparison of the development of political economy in the middle
of the eighteenth century in both Scotland and Naples. Comparison of two contexts
yields for Robertson one Enlightenment.
The first aspect of Robertson’s case is presented through the comparative
history of Scotland and Naples up to and around 1700. Working from the estab-
lishment of two different elite cultures, Robertson proceeds to outline the differ-
ences in the relationship between the political and intellectual culture of the two
countries through the prosecution of atheism in each (Thomas Aikenhead,
Francesco Manuzzi). These two episodes represent historical instances of the
difference between the two countries; significant debate and engagement with
Epicurean, Cartesian, and Augustinian ideas was evident in Naples, whereas in
Scotland it was the silence surrounding Aikenhead’s fate that Robertson claims
is so striking. However, as Michael Hunter has argued, the silence surrounding
Aikenhead’s fate was not total.4 There were significant voices of protest in
Scottish intellectual life, some of them public and several private, and it would
be wrong to regard Aikenhead’s fate as unremarked — it remained enough of
a point of interest for T. B. Macaulay to note it in his History of 1855. The contrast
between Neapolitan and Scottish intellectual life, and its alleged “vigour,” is
perhaps overstated and stands pointedly at odds with scholarly and popular
accounts of the Scottish Enlightenment presented by Nicholas Phillipson,
Alexander Broadie, or James Buchan.5 Robertson also implies that the Scottish
reticence to engage Augustinian-Epicureanism constitutes a lack of intellectual
vitality, making Naples more “advanced” and Edinburgh a murky backwater;
but even Hume’s failure to secure a post at a Scottish university can perhaps be
understood as a difference of fundamental philosophy, not intellectual
peevishness.6
4 Michael Hunter, “ ‘Aikenhead the Atheist’: The Context and Consequences of Articulate Irreligion in
the Late Seventeenth Century,” in Michael Hunter and David Wootton, eds., Atheism from the
Reformation to the Enlightenment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 221–254. See also Michael
Hunter, “The Problem of Atheism in Early Modern England,” Transactions of the Royal Historical
Society, Fifth Series 35 (1985), pp. 135–157.
5 Nicholas Phillipson, “Towards a Definition of the Scottish Enlightenment,” in Paul Fritz and David
Williams, eds., City & Society in the 18th Century (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973), pp. 125–147, and “The
Scottish Enlightenment in National Context,” in Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich, eds., The
Enlightenment in National Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 19–42;
Alexander Broadie, ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003); James Buchan, Capital of the Mind: How Edinburgh Changed
the World (London: John Murray, 2003). See also Paul Wood, ed., The Scottish Enlightenment:
Essays in Reinterpretation (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2000).
6 Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1988), pp. 281–325.
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If we turn to the second axis of Robertson’s argument, the problem of kingdoms
governed as provinces, another set of political, social, and intellectual contrasts are
presented to account for the development of different native political theories.
Robertson claims that Scots and Neapolitans were motivated by their common
political plight to considerations of man’s place in the world more generally.
That is, a science of human nature was in some tangible sense the product of a
social and political predicament. Robertson argues that, prior to a more systematic
consideration of human society and its history, theorists of both countries had
devoted their intellectual energies to considerations of political and economic pro-
blems generated by more general crises at the turn of the eighteenth century. In
short, intellectuals in both countries exercised their powers, honed their concep-
tual skills, and tested the waters by debating solutions to the challenges their
respective countries faced, prompting “the elaboration of a new approach to the
understanding of society and its improvement” (p. 147). Robertson takes the
figures of Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun for Scotland and Paolo Mattia Doria for
Naples as key figures, approaching the problem of kingdoms governed as pro-
vinces within a neo-Machiavellian framework. The most significant difference
for Robertson is Doria’s willingness, and Fletcher’s reticence, to consider ques-
tions of economy. However, this is a scholarly gap closed by moving forward in
time and in intellectual complexity through the work of Giambattista Vico and
David Hume. Vico and Hume provide the third axis in Robertson’s account.
For Robertson, Vico and Hume confront modern Epicureanism as articulated
by Bayle and Mandeville and working these encounters into their
Enlightenment projects of progress and improvement. Neither thinker was
inclined to take on board vulgar Epicurean philosophy, but instead they drew
on what they took to be compelling elements (self-interest, for example) alongside
their concessions to the “new philosophy” and proceeded to develop a set of con-
ceptual resources that Robertson finds recognizably enlightened in similar periods
across European space. The crucial difference was one of emphasis: Vico
responded negatively, Hume positively. What places Hume, and not Vico (who
must be content to fit in the “pre-Enlightenment”), at the centre of the case for
“the” Enlightenment was his adoption of the radical critique of Christian religion
and morality, combined with the development of political economy as a frame-
work for a philosophy of human betterment with no reference to the afterlife.
Thus Hume meets all the Enlightenment criteria Robertson sets out. In contrast
to other accounts of “the” Enlightenment such as those of Peter Gay or
Jonathan Israel, Hume’s importance for Robertson’s case is paramount: Hume
stood at the “threshold” of Enlightenment, “ready to open the door” (pp. 261,
323).
The advent of the practice of political economy as a systematic inquiry into
social and economic behaviour, and its realization as a policy guide in politics
based upon an Epicurean vision of human nature in eighteenth-century
Scotland and Naples, represents for Robertson the simultaneous advent of
Enlightenment. In the two countries at mid-century, there emerged a group of
thinkers who saw themselves as part of a larger, European-wide intellectual
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community committed to understanding and publicizing the betterment of human
society on this earth alone. Simultaneously, these arguments were being aired to a
wider public and made in a form (political economy) in which the case for the
Enlightenment could in fact succeed.
It is a persuasive account, but there remain several critical problems. When
some particular thinker fails to make the cut (a Voltaire or a Thomas Reid,
say) because they lack the apparent intellectual rigour — to say nothing of intel-
lectualism this scheme presumes — are they thereby condemned to the
Enlightenment dustbin?7 In stating his case so strongly on such a narrow, restricted
set of criteria, Robertson undermines the ability of his account to secure the
broader conclusions he wishes to present. Indeed, it is quite possible to take
Robertson’s insightful analysis of an Andrew Fletcher or a David Hume on its
own, without following him down his more ambitious interpretive path.
Carey’s work seeks to highlight tension and opposition, while Robertson’s pro-
vides unity. There need not, of course, be any problem with reading both accounts
together. Yet both works raise the question first raised by Kant and echoed at the
outset of this essay: what is Enlightenment? Both scholars have provided different
ways of answering this question without attempting to silence their rivals. Indeed,
Robertson’s is a work dedicated to scholarly dialogue with other accounts, from
J. G. A. Pocock’s pluralities to Jonathan Israel’s Spinozisms to Robert
Darnton’s literary undergrounds. Both works help us once again rethink what is
at stake in Enlightenment scholarship, including not only its intellectual but also
its broader national, political, social, and cultural contexts. Whatever answers
future scholars offer, they will need to take into consideration these two important
books.
Both Carey and Robertson also provide valuable models of approaching the
historical material of the Enlightenment. Carey’s work provides a template not
only for how further study can open up neglected thinkers or neglected areas
of thought, but also for how such configurations can shed light on important con-
temporary debates. The politics of diversity is a subject of increasing importance,
and understanding how we came to think the way we do about identity, politics,
and human nature is an important component of considered judgement about
current debates. Carey asks us to rethink our understanding of diversity in light
of the debates of early modern English, Scottish, and Irish thought, without redu-
cing this to a single problem and solution. Robertson asks us, more ambitiously, to
rethink the specific criteria for understanding the Enlightenment in terms of a set
of arguments contextualized in different geographical areas revealing one under-
lying movement. In doing so, they both provide ample material for rethinking not
only our relationship to the past, but also how that past informs the present.
7 For similar criticisms of this kind of approach, see Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the
Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1985), pp. 3–19, and Enlightenment and the Book, pp. 1–24.
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As an ambassadorial aide, Hume performed his duties admirably (if at times he
was regarded as a buffoon); as an ambassador for philosophy, he succeeded rather
well (if living off his literary revenue is any indication of scholarly success). Hume
remains, of course, an important figure in any account of the Enlightenment, but
he does much more than confirm or question Robertson’s checklist.8 Hume’s
anthropology, if it can be called that, regarded human nature as fundamentally
universal but as finding different expression in different times and places, just as
the Rhine and Rhone rivers flowed in different directions from the mouth of
the Swiss Alps (see “A Dialogue” at the end of the second Enquiry). If the
subject of human nature and its consideration of diversity is introduced into the
Enlightenment, as Carey suggests, perhaps what Robertson describes as “frag-
mentary” accounts must in some sense return. Take, for example, the Scottish
Enlightenment’s stadial theory of civil society and philosophical history. In
attempting to be the polite ambassador of philosophy mentioned earlier, Hume
took up the historian’s pen; philosophical history and its authors may in fact be
an equally legitimate aspect of European Enlightenment. If Pocock and others
are right in insisting on the importance of the Enlightenment’s variegated intellec-
tual, cultural, social, and political make-up, then an account that singles out solely
materialist, progressive, and capitalist thinking simply cannot do. The case for




8 Brian Young, in Religion and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century England: Theological Debate from
Locke to Burke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), cautions against reading Hume as
progenitor of a secularizing force (p. 211).
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